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Abstract.	The	verification	of	arms-control	and	disarmament	agreements	requires	states	to	provide	declarations,	including	information	on	sensitive	military	sites	and	assets.	There	are	important	cases,	however,	where	negotiations	of	these	agreements	are	impeded	because	states	are	reluctant	to	provide	any	such	data,	because	of	concerns	about	prematurely	handing	over	militarily	significant	information.	To	address	this	challenge,	we	present	a	cryptographic	escrow	that	allows	a	state	to	make	a	complete	declaration	of	sites	and	assets	at	the	outset	and	commit	to	its	content,	but	only	reveal	the	sensitive	information	therein	sequentially.	Combined	with	an	inspection	regime,	our	escrow	allows	for	step-by-step	verification	of	the	correctness	and	completeness	of	the	initial	declaration	so	that	the	information	release	and	inspections	keep	pace	with	parallel	diplomatic	and	political	processes.		We	apply	this	approach	to	the	possible	denuclearization	of	North	Korea.	Such	approach	can	be	applied,	however,	to	any	agreement	requiring	the	sharing	of	sensitive	information.	
Introduction	
Ever	since	the	Strategic	Arms	Limitation	Talks	between	the	United	States	and	the	Soviet	Union,	nuclear	arms-control	treaties	have	involved	transparency	measures	and	the	exchange	of	information1.	Negotiating	deep	cuts	in	U.S.	and	Russian	nuclear	arsenals	would	require	unprecedented	disclosures,	however.	In	1997,	a	National	Academy	of	Sciences	study	proposed	these	transparency	measures	could	include2:	“the	current	location,	type,	and	status	of	all	nuclear	explosive	devices	and	the	history	of	every	nuclear	explosive	device	manufactured,	including	the	dates	of	assembly	and	dismantling	or	destruction	in	explosive	tests;	a	description	of	facilities	at	which	nuclear	explosives	have	been	designed,	assembled,	tested,	stored,	deployed,	maintained,	and	dismantled,	and	which	produced	or	fabricated	key	weapon	components	and	nuclear	materials;	and	the	relevant	operating	records	of	these	facilities.”	Such	disclosures	are	difficult	to	undertake,	because	they	could	provide	an	adversary	with	military	significant	information	at	an	early	stage.	In	a	2005	study,	the	National	Academy	of	Sciences’	Committee	on	International	Security	&	Arms	Control	suggested	that	cryptography	could	help	address	this	problem3.	
A	similar	challenge	is	arising	today	in	the	context	of	U.S.	–	Democratic	People’s	Republic	of	Korea	(DPRK)	talks	on	the	denuclearization	of	the	Korean	Peninsula.	This	is	because	denuclearization	shares	many	of	the	problems	associated	with	deep	nuclear	reductions	in	a	very	acute	way.	As	part	of	an	agreement,	the	DPRK	would	most	likely	be	required	to	provide	data	and	disclose	activities	related	to	its	nuclear	and	ballistic-missile	programs,	as	well	as	submit	to	observation	and	onsite	inspections	by	the	international	community4–6.	Prior	verification	plans	proposed	by	the	United	States7,	asked	the	DPRK	to	make	substantial	and	detailed	baseline	declarations	including:	the	current	location,	type,	and	status	of	all	nuclear	weapons	and	associated	components;	a	description	of	facilities	at	which	nuclear	materials	
and	weapons	have	been	produced,	designed,	assembled,	tested,	stored,	and	deployed;	and	data	on	the	quantities	and	characteristics	of	declared	nuclear	material.	From	the	DPRK	point	of	view,	agreeing	to	such	demands	may	be	too	risky:	it	would	provide	the	United	States	with	a	potentially	comprehensive	map	of	its	military	and	nuclear	weapons-related	assets	at	a	very	early	stage	in	the	diplomatic	process,	which	could	become	an	important	security	threat	if	negotiations	were	to	collapse.	But	given	the	strong	U.S.	public	commitment	to	verifiable	denuclearization,	it	is	difficult	to	conceive	a	successful	diplomatic	outcome	in	which	the	DPRK	would	not	provide	any	kind	of	useful	declaration8,9.	
Here,	we	address	this	negotiation	challenge	by	presenting	an	approach	to	declarations	that	provides	a	secure	information-sharing	mechanism	for	a	state	to	sequentially	reveal	relevant	sensitive	information	to	another	state	while	requiring	the	country	making	declarations	to	commit	to	the	correctness	and	completeness	of	their	initial	declaration	at	the	outset,	potentially	even	before	negotiations	start.	This	cryptographic	escrow	scheme	then	enables	the	release	of	partial	information	for	verification	at	later	stages,	as	opposed	to	engaging	in	the	full	disclosure	of	all	data	at	once	(Fig.	1).	This	allows	data	exchanges	to	keep	pace	with	confidence-building	measures.	
Our	escrow	leverages	cryptographic	primitives,	in	particular	commitment	schemes10.	Such	schemes	allow	a	party	to	commit	to	a	particular	piece	of	information,	or	value,	while	keeping	it	hidden	from	others.	The	committing	party	can	release	the	value	at	a	later	stage	while	ensuring	other	parties	it	was	not	altered.		
While	verifying	the	denuclearization	of	North	Korea	is	a	particularly	relevant	application	for	our	approach,	similar	escrow	scheme	could	be	used	in	other	international	agreements	including	the	exchange	of	secure	declaration	as	part	of	future	U.S.	–	Russia	arms-reduction	
efforts3,	or	the	declaration	of	sensitive	information	(e.g.	identification	and	location	of	pollution	emitters)	in	environmental	agreements11,12.		
	
	
Figure	1.	Using	a	cryptographic	escrow	in	an	inspection	regime.	(1)	A	detailed	initial	declaration	is	produced	by	the	inspected	party	and	placed	in	an	escrow.	A	cryptographic	commitment	to	this	declaration	is	made	public.	(2)	The	negotiations	are	ongoing.	The	escrow	is	built	such	that	is	possible	to	reveal	only	partial	information	at	a	time.	(3)	Prior	to	an	on-site	inspection,	partial	information	about	a	site	(location,	status	and	items)	is	revealed	to	the	inspecting	party.	The	inspections	eventually	confirm	the	correctness	of	this	information.	(N)	As	negotiations	move	forward,	information	is	released	incrementally	until	the	complete	declaration	is	revealed.	Only	then	the	inspecting	party	has	a	complete	picture	of	the	inspected	party	assets.	
Escrow	Construction	
The	most	basic	construction	for	our	escrow	could	be	a	cryptographic	commitment	of	the	entire	declaration.	One	way	to	implement	a	commitment	scheme	is	through	the	application	of	cryptographic	hash	functions.	In	general,	the	hash	of	a	message	is	much	shorter	than	the	message	itself,	and	the	underlying	cryptographic	hash	function	is	designed	such	that	it	is	infeasible	to	find	a	valid	message	for	a	given	hash	(assuming	the	values	being	hashed	are	drawn	from	a	random	distribution	with	high	entropy)	and	infeasible	to	construct	two	different	messages	that	produce	the	same	hash	(a	property	called	collision	resistance).	In	principle,	multiple	hash	functions	can	be	combined,	using	robust	multi-property	combiners,	
so	that	each	of	the	necessary	cryptographic	properties	holds	for	the	combination	if	it	holds	for	at	least	one	of	the	hash	functions	being	combined13.	This	could	be	used,	for	example,	to	allow	each	party	in	our	scheme	to	propose	a	hash	function	he	or	she	trusts,	and	to	use	a	combined	hash	function	that	has	the	desired	security	if	either	one	of	the	parties'	chosen	hash	functions	is	secure.	
	
Figure	2.	Sites	declaration	using	a	Merkle	Tree	structure.	Each	leaf	of	the	tree	contains	information	on	individual	sites.	The	information	of	each	data	block	is	hashed	individually,	the	upper	nodes	hashes	“0”	and	“1”	are	obtained	by	hashing	the	concatenation	of	the	two	lower	hashes	up	to	the	Top	Hash	or	root	of	the	tree.	To	later	demonstrate	that	the	information	of	Site	4	was	part	of	the	declaration,	the	prover	needs	to	supply	the	clear	text	of	Site	4,	the	hash	of	Site	4	(Hash	1-1),	the	hash	1-0,	the	Hash	1	and	the	Top	Hash.	The	process	does	not	reveal	information	about	any	other	sites.	
	
Simply	committing	to	the	complete	declaration	would	not	provide	for	any	flexibility	on	how	much	and	what	information	can	be	revealed	at	a	time,	however.	To	address	this	issue,	we	turn	our	escrow	into	a	binary	Merkle	tree14	(see	Fig.	2).	The	tree	is	constructed	as	follows:	every	leaf	(or	childless	node)	can	store	any	string,	for	example,	a	cryptographic	
commitment	to	a	data	block	with	information	related	to	a	specific	site,	including,	in	the	case	of	North	Korea,	the	denuclearization-relevant	items	stored	at	the	site.	Any	non-leaf	node	must	store	the	value	Hash(L,R)	whenever	its	left	child	stores	L	and	right	child	stores	R.	The	root	of	the	tree	then	represents	a	commitment	to	the	entire	declaration	and	would	be	the	only	piece	of	information	made	public	at	the	beginning	of	the	diplomatic	process.	
Furthermore,	we	build	the	tree	such	that	a	pair	of	geographic	coordinates	in	the	country	corresponds	to	a	unique	leaf	in	the	tree.	To	do	so,	we	superpose	a	grid	over	the	map	of	country	(see	Fig.	3).	For	North	Korea,	the	grid	is	limited	by	latitudes	37.5°	N	and	43.5°	N,	and	longitudes	124.0°	E	and	131.0°	E.	We	then	construct	a	local	coordinate	system	(i,j)	with	the	point	(43.5°	N,	124.0°	E)	as	the	origin.	The	number	of	grid	points	depends	on	the	chosen	resolution	in	latitude	and	longitude.	For	a	resolution	of	one	minute	in	both	latitude	and	longitude	(corresponding	to	~1.15	miles	N-S	and	~0.89	miles	E-W),	as	called	for	in	existing	arms-control	agreements	requiring	the	sharing	of	coordinates	information15,	there	will	be	7*6*602	=	151200	points.	Each	point	is	numbered	individually	using	its	local	coordinates	(i,j).	The	numbers	are	converted	in	base	2	and	concatenated	to	obtain	the	corresponding	binary	key	x.	For	example,	the	point	of	coordinates	(7*60,	6*60)	on	the	one-minute	resolution	grid	corresponds	to	the	key	x	=	110100100101101000	of	length	l	=	18	bits.		
Because	the	number	of	grid	points	is	not	too	large,	we	opt	for	a	simplified	construction	in	which	there	is	a	leaf	node	for	every	grid	point.	In	scenarios	where	the	number	of	grid	points	would	make	the	tree	too	large	to	be	practical,	other	cryptographic	data	structures16	could	provide	the	necessary	properties	without	requiring	the	declaring	party	to	store	data	for	every	empty	grid	point.	
	
	
Figure	3.	Mapping	a	site	coordinates	to	a	Merkle	tree	leaf.	Local	coordinates	(i,j)	placed	over	the	DPRK	(A)	can	identify	uniquely	each	location	in	the	country	with	a	given	precision.		The	numbers	i	and	j	are	then	converted	in	their	binary	equivalent	and	concatenated	into	a	string	x	corresponding	to	the	binary	path	from	the	root	to	the	corresponding	leaf	in	our	Merkle	tree	(B).	Each	leaf	of	the	tree	either	stores	a	commitment	to	information	about	an	existing	site	or	to	nothing	if	no	site	is	present	at	this	location.	
In	a	tree	of	depth	l,	each	leaf	is	then	reached	uniquely	from	the	root	via	the	path	defined	by	x	(see	Fig.	3),	and	contains	a	commitment	on	whether	or	not	there	is	a	site	at	this	location	and	any	other	relevant	information	about	the	site,	if	it	exists.	In	the	case	of	North	Korea,	the	number	of	sites	to	be	declared	is	expected	to	be	~	100–20017,	much	smaller	than	the	number	of	leafs,	2l.	This	construction	allows	information	about	any	grid	point,	or	any	subset	of	grid	points,	to	be	revealed	without	conveying	information	about	any	other	grid	points.	
Step-by-Step	Verification	in	a	Freeze	Scenario	
Figure	4	presents	a	cryptographic	commitment	(using	a	hash	function)	to	information	about	a	hypothetical	nuclear	weapons	storage	site,	which	would	be	stored	in	the	leaf	in	the	tree	
corresponding	to	the	site	location.	The	commitment	is	obtained	by	hashing	a	message	“m_0”	containing	different	pieces:	a	random	number	generated	by	the	committing	party,	another	random	number	provided	by	an	outside	party	to	guarantee	freshness	of	the	information18	(i.e.,	that	the	commitment	was	produced	after	the	outside	party’s	random	number	was	generated),	information	regarding	the	entry	including	for	example	the	type	of	facility,	coordinates,	and	status,	and	finally	additional	information	“m_1”,	which	represent	commitments	to	additional	data	that	may	be	shared	at	a	later	stage,	for	example	prior	to	the	inspection	of	the	site	in	question.	
	
Figure	4.	Example	of	message	digest	for	a	storage	site.	Data	is	encapsulated	in	multiple	levels,	which	can	be	revealed	at	different	points	in	time.	The	level	0	message	contains	a	random	number	generated	by	the	host,	a	random	number	provided	by	inspectors	to	guarantee	freshness	of	the	commitment,	clear	text	data	and	the	hash	of	the	level	1	message.	The	level	1	message	contains	additional	data	(here	the	number	of	warheads,	missiles,	amounts	of	uranium	and	plutonium,	and	their	isotopics),	which	may	be	released	at	a	later	stage,	for	example	prior	to	inspection.		The	message	digests	(generated	with	SHA3-256)	are	for	illustration	purpose	only.	
As	a	preliminary	step	in	a	verified	denuclearization	process	following	a	phased	approach4,	the	DPRK	could	agree	on	freezing	the	production	of	fissile	materials	and	components	for	weapons	as	well	as	on	monitored	storage	of	existing	weapons.	Under	this	framework,	the	DPRK	would	produce	a	complete	escrow	of	all	production,	storage,	and	deployment	sites	of	nuclear	weapons,	missiles,	and	associated	components.	It	would	then	commit	to	the	inventories	at	each	site	and	agree	not	to	move	assets	between	sites.	(Movement	patterns	between	sites	could	be	monitored	with	satellites.)	
To	verify	correctness	of	the	declaration,	the	DPRK	would	invite	the	United	States	to	perform	onsite	inspections	and	verify	that	the	assets	and	information	declared	in	the	escrow	are	present	and	valid.	During	these	inspections,	accountable	items	could	be	tagged	with	unique	identifiers19,	the	United	States	would	become	more	confident	that	a	freeze	is	indeed	in	effect	and	that	the	rest	of	the	declaration,	which	has	yet	to	be	revealed,	is	correct.	
Confidence	from	the	U.S.	point	of	view	would	increase	if	sites	could	be	picked	at	random20,	although	the	DPRK	may	prefer	to	reveal	the	location	and	inventories	at	each	site	in	the	order	it	decides,	for	example	starting	with	sites	that	are	already	known	or	considered	less	sensitive.	Because	each	site	can	be	revealed	without	compromising	others,	the	pace	of	inspections	can	be	adapted	to	the	political	process,	making	this	approach	well	suited	for	an	“action	for	action”	negotiating	process,	where	both	side	would	make	incremental	concessions	working	towards	an	ultimate	settlement.	
Combining	the	properties	of	the	escrow	and	the	possibility	to	perform	challenge	inspections	would	facilitate	the	process	of	establishing	completeness	of	the	declaration.	If	the	United	States	believes	it	has	detected	proscribed	activities	at	an	undeclared	site,	it	could	provide	North	Korea	with	the	site	coordinates,	corresponding	to	a	specific	key	x.	The	DPRK	could	
escrow,	both	parties	would	wait	and	plan	for	a	future	inspection	to	confirm	the	correctness	of	the	declaration.	If	the	site	is	not	in	the	escrow,	a	special	inspection	would	have	to	take	place	to	demonstrate	that	no	proscribed	activities	are	taking	place	at	the	site.	Given	this	risk	of	exposure,	it	would	be	in	the	interest	of	the	DPRK	to	produce	a	complete	declaration	from	the	very	beginning.	
Security	of	the	Escrow	
Overall,	for	the	viability	of	our	approach,	it	is	imperative	that	the	message	length,	the	message	content,	and	the	implementation	of	the	commitment	protocol	are	robust	against	all	relevant	types	of	cryptographic	attacks.	When	using	hash	functions,	it	is	important	to	be	mindful	of	the	potential	for	preimage,	and	collision	attacks21.	Preimage	attacks	would	allow	finding	a	message	corresponding	to	a	given	hash	produced	with	a	particular	hash	function.	
(If	the	length	of	a	hash	is	n	bits,	a	brute	force	attack	would	requires	~	2!! 	evaluations	of	the	hash	function	for	finding	a	collision	between	two	messages,	and	~	2!	evaluations	for	finding	preimages	and	second	preimages.).	These	would	compromise	the	information	committed	in	our	escrow.	So	far,	there	have	been	no	known	successful	preimage	attacks	on	NIST	recommended	hash	functions22,23.		
What	is	more	typical	for	past	hash	functions,	however,	has	been	the	discovery	of	collision	attacks,	which	would	challenge	the	binding	property	of	the	commitment	scheme24,25.	A	recent	practical	example,	is	the	discovery	of	the	first	collision	for	SHA-1	using	a	method	to	produce	two	PDF	documents	producing	the	same	hash26.	Discovery	of	a	SHA-1	collision	was	anticipated	for	many	years	before	it	occurred,	however.		In	our	case,	new	collision	attacks	could	affect	the	security	of	past	declarations	if	they	also	allow	to	conduct	secondary	preimage	attacks.	These	risks	could	be	mitigated	by	using	hash	function	combiners,	
allowing	multiple	hash	functions	to	be	combined	in	such	a	way	that	the	combination	is	collision-free	if	at	least	one	of	the	constituent	hash	functions	is	collision-free13.	If	doubt	should	arise	about	the	continued	collision-freedom	of	the	hash	functions	being	used,	commitments	could	be	re-generated	to	include	a	new	combination	of	hash	functions,	to	provide	additional	insurance	against	collisions.	
Conclusion	
North	Korean	diplomats	could	walk	to	the	negotiation	table	to	meet	their	U.S.	counterparts	with	a	256-bit	or	512-bit	message	on	a	piece	of	paper.	Using	the	escrow	scheme	developed	in	this	paper,	this	simple	message	could	represent	a	commitment	to	a	database	containing	every	single	bit	of	information	about	their	nuclear	and	ballistic	missile	programs.	Doing	so	would	fulfill	a	U.S.	demand	to	provide	a	comprehensive	declaration	of	sites	and	assets.	It	would	also	prevent	the	United	States	from	walking	away	with	this	information,	a	potentially	unacceptable	security	threat	for	North	Korea.		
We	showed	how	to	combine	our	escrow	with	an	inspection	regime	to	verify	the	correctness	and	completeness	of	a	sites	declaration	in	a	step-by-step	approach.	While	not	all	information	is	available	upfront	to	inspectors,	confidence	in	the	validity	of	the	overall	declaration	grows	with	each	successful	inspection.	Our	approach	also	allows	the	inspected	party	to	commit	to	additional	information	documenting	weapon	design,	production	records,	and	movement	of	assets	through	the	weapons	complex.		
The	approach	presented	in	this	paper	has	the	potential	to	resolve	a	longstanding	diplomatic	deadlock:	the	United	States	wants	a	correct	and	complete	declaration	from	the	DPRK,	which	in	return	does	not	want	to	provide	a	target	list	that	could	enable	a	preventive	military	attack.	Our	proposal	resolves	this	tension	by	allowing	the	DPRK	to	commit	to	such	a	
declaration,	which	is	gradually	revealed	as	the	diplomatic	process	proceeds.	In	the	longer	term,	the	case	of	North	Korea	could	serve	as	an	important	precedent	for	using	modern	cryptographic	techniques	to	support	nuclear	arms-control	and	disarmament.	
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